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We draw from long-term research in Shenzhen, a 
manufacturing hub in the South of China, to critically 
examine the role of participation in the contemporary 
discourse around maker culture. In lowering the barriers of 
technological production, “making” is being envisioned as a 
new site of entrepreneurship, economic growth and 
innovation. Our research shows how the city of Shenzhen is 
figuring as a key site in implementing this vision.  In this 
paper, we explore the “making of Shenzhen” as the “Silicon 
Valley for hardware.” We examine, in particular, how 
maker-entrepreneurs are drawn to processes of design and 
open sharing central to the manufacturing culture of 
Shenzhen, challenging conceptual binaries of design as a 
creative process versus manufacturing as its numb 
execution. Drawing from the legacy of participatory design 
and critical computing, the paper examines the social, 
material, and economic conditions that underlie the growing 
relationship between contemporary maker culture and the 
concomitant remake of Shenzhen.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Critical scholarship of computing has long been committed 
to questioning the apparently strict separation between 
production and consumption, design and use. One of the 
most widely known and impactful approaches has been 
participatory design (PD). With roots in the Scandinavian 
labor movement in the 1970s, PD emerged alongside 
outsourcing, automation and the introduction of 
Information Technology into the workplace. PD sought to 
intervene in these processes, promoting the view that the 
user and the larger social context and surrounding material 
culture should be central to considerations and processes of 
design [3, 6, 7, 27, 43]. Drawing on this work, this paper 
argues that contemporary processes of technology design 
necessarily include the place and culture of production. 
Today, PD’s call for involvement of users into the design 
process is not only accepted in popular design approaches 
such as human-centered design, but has also morphed into a 
business strategy. Bannon and Ehn, for instance, document 
the ways in which corporations promote the view that users 
and designers co-create value [3]. They illustrate the 
expansion of “a managerial version of user driven design” 
rooted in “market-oriented business models removed from 
PD concerns” [3]. Closed company innovation has 
increasingly given way to “open innovation” models, where 
creativity, knowledge and expertise of users are leveraged 
for company profit.  
PD’s call for critical intervention is further complicated by 
the recent flurry of devices and tools ranging from social 
media apps to smart devices (or Internet of Things), whose 
value depends on the participation of users. While 
companies like Facebook mine behavior data online to sell 
it back to its users in the form of ads, newer companies like 
Misfit see the value of smart wearables in the sensitive data 
their users generate and share by wearing the device while 
sleeping, walking, driving, working, exercising, etc. 
Advocates of the “maker movement” also celebrate a new 
formulation of user participation. By providing the tools, 
machines and platforms that enable people to make their 
own technologies, “makers” hope to turn passive consumers 
into active participants not only in technological design, but 
also in economic processes and civic matters (for prior 
work see e.g. [2, 18, 25, 31, 33, 39, 40, 45]. Open hardware 
platforms like the Arduino and affordable CNC machines 
like the 3D printer are envisioned to enable otherwise 
passive consumers to produce their own devices, tools, and 
eventually machines. 
This contemporary promotion of “participatory production” 
[3] has critical gaps, as a return to the original concerns 
central to participatory design makes clear. Although design 
has been opened up to include and benefit from the 
participation of users (as elaborated above), the question of 
who is considered a legitimate participant in the design 
process has remained fairly limited. In particular, there is 
often an unspoken separation between what happens in the 
design studio, makerspace, hardware incubator or home 
office (the site of ideation, co-creation, appropriation, and 
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day-to-day use) and what happens on the factory floor (the 
site of manufacture, production, and wage labor). The 
“human” in human-centered design, the “participant” in 
participatory design, and the “maker” who advocates the 
“democraticization” of production concentrates on the 
designer-user/producer-consumer relationship, but rarely on 
the relationship to the factory worker, producer, mechanical 
engineer, and so on. This is particularly ironic considering 
PD’s original concern to intervene in processes of 
outsourcing, deskilling of labor, and the re-organization of 
work [3, 6, 7].  The central argument of what follows is that  
‘participation’ in the design process does not only include 
the social context of the end user, but also, crucially, the 
material, socio-economic and cultural context of 
production. This paper demonstrates this by focusing on the 
manufacturing hub of Shenzhen, China, as a crucial agent 
in much of the design and creation of contemporary 
technology.  
“Making” is often celebrated as a method that might 
revitalize industrial production in Western knowledge 
economies, e.g. [1]. In reality, this is not a straight-forward 
or easy process. Many hardware start-ups face difficulties 
in transitioning from hobby to professional making and 
manufacturing [16, 49]. A number of businesses have tried 
to capitalize on these difficulties by providing maker-
entrepreneurs with an access to manufacturing in China. 
Take, for instance, Highway1, a hardware incubator in San 
Francisco, which promises start-ups a smooth transition into 
mass manufacturing without having to spend substantial 
amounts of time at their China-based manufacturing sites. 
Here, engaging with manufacturing expertise is rendered a 
problem space and an inconvenient hurdle for designers, 
makers and start-ups. Implicit in this approach is a 
widespread conception of technology production, which 
splits manufacturing and design along geographical lines; in 
which technology is conceived and designed in the West, 
and then manufactured in low-wage regions with loose 
regulatory environments. The evidence of this idea of 
design is emblazoned on the iPhone: “Designed by Apple in 
California. Assembled in China.” Designers, here, are 
understood as the agents, with their ideas being executed 
elsewhere. In its most extreme formulation this division 
corresponds to a Cartesian inspired ‘mind-body dualism’ in 
which an active rational mind in the West guides a passive, 
inert body in the so-called developing world. 
In this paper, we build on prior work that has begun 
challenge simplistic binaries of design-production, 
examining processes and cultures of design, making, and 
repair in regions outside of the United States and Europe [3, 
23, 25, 39]. Drawing from research with mobile repair 
workers in rural Namibia, for example, Jackson et al. [25] 
focus on mundane sites of repair, breakdown and reuse as 
important, but often neglected sites of design. In engaging 
with these often overlooked places, commonly thought of 
as technologically, economically and socially “behind,” 
scholars have argued for an approach that challenges 
models of technological production in which design and 
innovation are seen to emerge predominantly from global 
epicenters in the West (e.g. Silicon Valley) [2, 3, 13, 23, 25, 
38].  
Our work builds upon this research, by taking seriously 
manufacturing as site of expertise, design and creative 
work. We draw from long-term ethnographic research with 
factories, makers, and hardware start-ups in Shenzhen, a 
global hub of electronic manufacturing located in Southern 
China. In this paper, we analyze the social, technological, 
and economic processes of manufacturing in Shenzhen, 
rooted in a culture of tinkering and open source production 
that has evolved in the shadows of global outsourcing and 
large-scale contract manufacturing. We demonstrate that a 
growing number of maker entrepreneurs have begun to 
intersect with this manufacturing ecosystem, experimenting 
with modes of design, production, and collaboration. 
Examining these intensifying collaborations enables a 
deeper and nuanced conceptualization of both design and of 
the ongoing transformation of Shenzhen.  
Shenzhen & the maker movement 
In the last years, there has been a growing interest in the 
potential impact of a so-called “maker” approach to 
technological innovation, education, and economic growth 
[29]. “Making” is thought to enable a move from tinkering 
and play, to prototyping and entrepreneurship and, finally, 
to help revive industries and sites of manufacturing lost due 
to histories of outsourcing. Making is drawing investment 
from governments, venture capitalists, and corporations 
around the world. While the US government promotes 
digital fabrication and making as a way to return to the 
“made in America” brand (with the White House hosting its 
own Maker Faire) [33, 36], the European Union has 
introduced formal policies aimed at rebuilding 
manufacturing capacities and know-how in order to sustain 
their knowledge economies [15]. Large international 
corporations have also started to invest. In 2013, Intel 
introduced the Arduino compatible Galileo board; an “Intel 
inside” microcontroller platform aimed at branding Intel as 
a champion of the maker approach. 
Our work challenges the dominant narratives of maker 
culture by critically investigating the relationship between 
making, designing, and manufacturing. We argue for a 
return to one of the most fundamental concerns of PD, i.e. 
to foreground the expertise, tacit and situated knowledge of 
everyday work practice [43, 46]. Our focus is on the ways 
in which the city of Shenzhen has emerged as a central 
player in the broader imaginary as making shifts from 
hobby to entrepreneurial practice. Shenzhen figures in the 
global maker imaginary as a “maker’s dream city” or “the 
Silicon Valley for hardware,” where visions of 
technological futures get implemented today. Until recently, 
few technology researchers and people in the broader IT 
media sector have paid much attention to Shenzhen. This 
began to change, when a growing number of “makers” 
 
traveled to the coastal metropolis to turn their ideas into 
end-consumer products. Well-known examples of these 
made-in-China devices are the virtual reality goggles 
Oculus Rift and the Pebble smart watch. In 2012, one of the 
first hardware incubator programs, HAXLR8R (now 
renamed as HAX), opened its offices in Shenzhen. Other 
investment programs such as Highway1, Bolt, and Dragon 
Innovation followed suit. Shenzhen draws not only makers 
and hardware start-ups, but also large corporations such as 
Intel, Texas Instruments, Huawei, and more. Intel, for 
instance, has invested 100 million USD in what the 
company calls the “China Technology Ecosystem” in 
Shenzhen [22]. Since 2013, the MIT Media Lab has 
organized tours for its students through Shenzhen’s 
electronic markets and factories. In a recent blog post Joi 
Ito, head of the Media Lab, records his impressions, 
describing local factories as “willing and able to design and 
try all kinds of new processes to produce things that have 
never been manufactured before” [24]. 
How did Shenzhen, once known as a site of cheap and low 
quality production, become the place to be for 
contemporary hardware innovation? How have design 
processes, such as those that Ito speaks of, developed and 
fed into the culture of manufacturing that has emerged in 
the city over the past three decades? Who is considered a 
legitimate participant and what sites of expertise and design 
are rendered invisible? 
The findings presented in this paper challenge the common 
binary of “made in China” versus “designed in California” 
that inherently associates the West with creativity and 
innovation and China with low quality production. We 
argue that what we witness in Shenzhen today has an 
important impact on the relationship between making, 
manufacturing and design. This paper contributes by 
shedding light on a situated practice of design, prototyping 
and ideation that emerges from within manufacturing. The 
paper, thus, provides new insights into histories and 
cultures of professional design and making that have 
emerged outside of more familiar IT hubs such as Silicon 
Valley [41, 47]. Our aim is to foster an engagement with 
mundane sites of contemporary industrial production – like 
Shenzhen – in order to advance a critical inquiry of design, 
maker production, global processes of technology work and 
labor, and participation. 
METHODS & APPROACH 
We draw from long-term research about technology 
production in China in order to examine the cultural and 
technological processes that unfold at the intersection of 
design and manufacturing. This includes in-depth 
ethnographic research conducted over 5 years, hands-on 
participation in maker and manufacturing projects, and the 
hosting of a series of interdisciplinary workshops and 
conferences that brought together scholars and practitioners 
concerned with making and manufacturing. Ethnographic 
research conducted by the first author included long-term 
participant observation in five hackerspaces and at over 
thirty maker-related events such as Maker Faires, Maker 
Carnivals, Hackathons, Barcamps, and Arduino workshops 
across the cities of Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen, as 
well as several months of ethnographic fieldwork at a 
hardware incubator in Shenzhen, following the day-to-day 
workings of ten start-ups and their journeys of moving from 
idea into production. Participant observation at 
hackerspaces included joining daily affairs such as 
prototyping, space management, member meet-ups, open 
houses, and the organization of workshops. The research at 
the hardware incubator included daily observations at the 
office space as well as accompanying start-ups during 
sourcing, prototyping, and manufacturing.  
Between 2012 and 2014, we made numerous trips to 
Shenzhen to focus on the history and culture of the region’s 
local manufacturing industry. We hosted a series of hands-
on workshops and intensive research trips in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen (in total 5 over the duration of two years). These 
events enabled us to bring together an interdisciplinary 
network of 120 scholars, makers and industry partners from 
China, the United States, South-East Asia, and Europe 
concerned with “making.” Backgrounds of our participants 
spanned the fields of HCI, the arts, design, engineering, 
manufacturing, science fiction writing, and philosophy.  
Throughout these events, we collated hundreds of hours of 
video and audio material of interviews, field visits, panel 
discussions, hands-on workshops and discussion sessions. 
In total, we conducted over 150 formal interviews with 
relevant stakeholders including makers, members and 
founders of hacker and maker spaces, organizers of maker 
related events, factory workers, owners, and managers, 
government officials and policy makers, employees in 
design firms and large IT corporations who were invested 
in making and manufacturing, artists and urban planners, 
entrepreneurs and investors. As common in ethnographic 
research, we prepared sets of interview questions, which we 
expanded and modified as we went along and identified 
emergent themes and new questions. We combined 
discourse analysis, situational analysis [11], and research 
through design [5, 51]. Although we have interviewed 
people from a wide range of backgrounds, for the purposes 
of this paper, we draw on a subset of our interviews, which 
were conducted with people active in Shenzhen’s 
manufacturing industry as well as those from the global 
maker scene who are intersecting with manufacturing. As 
many of our interviewees are public figures, we refer them, 
when they spoke in a public context (e.g. at workshops, 
conferences, Maker Faires, etc.), by their real names. We 
anonymized all informal conversations and interviewees 
who preferred not to be named. 
Our research team comes from a mixed background 
including interaction design, HCI, cultural anthropology, 
China studies, urban studies, philosophy, entrepreneurship, 
and physical computing. This has proven to be effective in 
 
allowing an in-depth engagement with both the 
technological and social practices of making and 
manufacturing. All of us speak Mandarin Chinese (one of 
us is a native speaker and the other two have received 
formal language training for more than 5 years). Interviews 
were conducted in both English and Chinese. All formal 
interviews were professionally translated and transcribed.  
SHENZHEN: FROM OUTSOURCING TO SHANZHAI 
Shenzhen is a young city; the build up of its urban 
landscape dates back only 30 years ago, when a series of 
village collectives began to be transformed into one of the 
world’s largest manufacturing hubs, e.g. [14, 34]. This was 
in part enabled by the implementation of a government 
policy that declared Shenzhen a Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) [19, 30].  In 1979, when the SEZ policy went into 
effect, Shenzhen had a population of under 50 000, by 2010 
it had morphed into a metropolis of over 10 million people1.  
The growth of Shenzhen coincided with, and was propelled 
by, an outsourcing boom, which, to quote Lüthje et al., 
“emerged from the massive restructuring of the US 
information technology industry that began in the 1980s” 
[30]. Throughout this period, companies in the US and 
Europe moved their manufacturing facilities into low-cost 
regions of the so-called developing world. Shenzhen 
constituted a particularly attractive site; as an SEZ the 
barriers of entry for foreign corporations were significantly 
lowered, with a range of incentives including tax 
reductions, affordable rents and investments aimed at 
integrating science and industry with trade. The outsourcing 
of factories and manufacturing clusters radically reshaped 
the high tech districts of the United States. As a result, by 
the 1990s, with the rise of the “new economy,” the IT 
industry was “no longer dominated by vertically integrated 
giant corporations such as IBM but rather was shaped along 
horizontal lines of specialized suppliers of key components 
such as computer chips, software, hardware disk drives, and 
graphic cards” [30].  
With the gradual upgrade of technological and 
organizational skills in former low-cost assembly locations, 
a process of vertical re-integration began to take place. By 
the late 1990s, Taiwanese ODMs (original design 
manufacturing) such as Acer, HTC, Asus and Foxconn, 
which designed the manufactured product on behalf of their 
brand-name customers, started to develop substantial 
intellectual property rights on their own [30]. One 
particularly famous example is the ODM HTC that entered 
the market with its own branded cell phone. This shift 
began challenge the global leadership of established high-
tech economies.  
                                                           
1 We can’t do justice here to the complexity of Shenzhen’s history 
and direct the reader to work by Mary Ann O’Donnell, Juan Du, 
Winnie Wong, Josephine Ho, Carolyn Cartier, and others [9, 14, 
19, 34, 35, 50]. 
As contract manufacturers grew in size, and began catering 
predominantly to large brands, a network of entrepreneurs 
saw an opportunity to establish themselves in the gaps of 
the global economy. A dense web of manufacturing 
businesses emerged in Shenzhen, catering towards less 
well-known or no-name clients with smaller quantities, who 
were not of interest to the larger players. This less formal 
manufacturing ecosystem (known as shanzhai 山寨 in 
Chinese) is comprised of a horizontal web of component 
producers, traders, design solution houses, vendors, and 
assembly lines. They operate through an informal social 
network and a culture of sharing that has much in common 
with the global maker movement (though largely motivated 
by necessity rather than countercultural ideals). We now 
turn, in greater detail, to this local manufacturing culture. 
Shanzhai 山寨 
Shanzhai translates into English as mountain stronghold or 
mountain fortress, and connotes an informal, outlaw 
tradition. The term has been in use in China for a long time 
and features most prominently in folk stories like the 
Shuihuzhuan (water margins) that tells the adventures of 
108 rebels, who hide in the mountains and fight the 
establishment. Building on this common narrative, Jeffrey, 
describes shanzhai as the story of “outlaws who have gone 
away to the mountains, doing things within their own rules. 
There's an element of criminality about shanzhai, just the 
way that Robin Hood is a bit of an outlaw. But it's really 
about autonomy, independence, and very progressive 
survival techniques.“ [26].  
Scholars speculate that the term was first applied to 
manufacturing in the 1950s to describe small-scale family-
run factories in Hong Kong that produced cheap, low 
quality household items, in order to “mark their position 
outside the official economic order” [19]. They produced 
counterfeit products of well-known retail brands such as 
Gucci and Nike, and sold them in markets that would not 
buy the expensive originals. As electronic manufacturing 
migrated to Shenzhen the informal network of shanzhai 
manufacturing found a perfect product in the mobile phone. 
Shanzhai production includes not only copycat versions of 
the latest iPhone, but also new creations and innovations of 
phone design and functionality (see Figure 1).  
Within China, shanzhai devices are catered towards low-
income migrant populations that could not afford more 
expensive branded products. Shanzhai phones have a strong 
global market, targeting low-income populations in India, 
Africa, and Latin America [20, 48]. As the shanzhai 
ecosystem matures, we are beginning to see the 
development of branded phones. Xiaomi （小米），to 
take but one example, is an affordable smart phone that 
comes with a chic design and makes use of sophisticated 
branding techniques. Although it grew by leveraging the 
shanzhai industry, Xiaomi is rarely associated with it. 
 
Rather it has become widely accepted as a national phone 
brand that many Chinese are proud of.  
While some people associate shanzhai with stealing and 
low quality goods [48], there is a growing endorsement of 
shanzhai as a prime example of Chinese grassroots 
creativity that has innovated an open source approach to 
manufacturing. One strong proponent is Bunnie Huang, 
who gained widespread recognition when he hacked the 
Xbox in 2003. In a series of blog posts, Huang details the 
workings of shanzhai as a unique “innovation ecosystem 
[that developed] with little Western influence, thanks to 
political, language, and cultural isolation” [21].  Huang here 
refers to a highly efficient manufacturing ecosystem that 
rests on principles of open sharing that are different from, 
but also compatible with, more familiar open sharing 
cultures. 
Shanzhai is neither straightforward counterculture nor pro-
system. As a multi-billion USD industry, it is deeply 
embedded in contemporary modes of capitalist production. 
At the same time, with its roots in and ongoing practices of 
piracy and open sharing, shanzhai challenges any inherent 
link made between technological innovation and the tools, 
instruments, and value systems of proprietary, corporate 
research and development. As Jeffrey and Shaowen 
Bardzell argue, analysis that upholds the strict boundaries 
between critical design and affirmative design; resistance 
culture and capitalist culture is often too simplistic [4]. 
Shanzhai producers are acutely aware of the global market 
economy, and have developed incisive and canny strategies 
to negotiate, subvert, criticize, ironize, and profit from it 
[19]. The early and affordable shanzhai versions of the 
smart phone, for instance, were designed for customer 
segments that could not afford the expensive and branded 
phones on the market. Shanzhai disrupted who gets to 
decide over new markets, customers, and how tech business 
was to be done. In other words, issues of concern in critical 
and reflective design practice – such as “passivity,” 
“reinforcing the status-quo,” “illusion of choice” [4] – are 
as salient in shanzhai production as they are in conceptual 
design. It is particularly ironic, then, that while open 
hardware hacking in the West is celebrated as enabler of 
future innovation, the open manufacturing mechanism of 
shanzhai is often denounced as holding China back on its 
modernization path due to its lack of principles and norms 
such as the international copyright law [19]. In the next 
section we describe in greater detail the particularities of 
shanzhai’s open production. 
OPEN MANUFACTURING: GONGBAN & GONGMO 
During our research in Shenzhen, we met and interviewed 
many different players in shanzhai production ranging from 
component producers, vendors, traders, assembly, and 
design solution houses. One consistent element that we 
found to be at the core of shanzhai was the production of 
so-called “public boards,” called gongban (公版 ) in 
Chinese; production-ready boards designed for end-
consumer electronics as well as industry applications. 
Gongban are typically produced in independent design 
houses that link the component producers (e.g. a chip 
manufacturer) and the factories that assemble the different 
parts into phones, tablets, smart watches, medical devices, 
and so on.  
During our research, we followed closely the process of one 
of the region’s largest distributers and their internal design 
house that produces about 130 gongban per year. The 
design house does not sell any of these reference boards, 
but rather gives them out to potential customers for free, 
alongside a list of components that go into making the 
board as well as the design schematics. The company 
makes money by selling the components that go into the 
boards. As such, it is in their interest to support as many 
companies as possible to come up with creative “skins” and 
“shells” (called gongmo in Chinese) that are compatible 
with their boards. Their customers, then, take a gongban of 
their liking as is or build on top of it. The boards are 
designed so that the same board can go into many different 
casings: e.g. one board can make many different smart 
watches or many differently designed mobile phones. Since 
2010, years before Pebble Watch or the Apple Watch made 
news, thirty some companies in Shenzhen were shipping 
their own smart watches based on this open production 
mechanism (see Figure 2). 
The gongban public board functions like an advanced 
version of an open source hardware platform such as the 
Arduino, yet differs in that it constitutes a bridge into 
manufacturing. “We call this shanzhai in Shenzhen. It’s a 
mass production artwork,” explained Larry Ma 
(anonymized), the head of the aforementioned distributor’s 
design house. To Larry Ma, there is no question that 
shanzhai is different from simple copycat. “First, shanzhai 
needs creativity: it is something only a person with a quick 
reaction who knows the industry chain very well can do.  
Figure 1. Examples of four shanzhai phones (from left to 
right): phone shaped as apple, phones shaped after children's 
toy and Chinese alcohol brand, phone that also functions as 
flashlight and radio. Photos taken by authors, 2012-2014. 
 
 
Figure 2. Gongban (public/open board) and Gongmo 
(public/open casing) of a smart watch, Shenzhen, China. Photo 
taken by authors, April 2014. 
Shanzhai makers are asking themselves what the normal 
people will need next… It is very important that you are 
very familiar with the upstream and downstream industry 
chain. And there is a kind of hunger. These three elements 
together make it an art work… it’s about being hungry for 
the future.”  
Larry Ma’s R&D unit is one of many corporate entities in 
the shanzhai ecosystem that have grown over the years into 
substantial businesses. This growth has occurred outside the 
traditional IP regime, using an open manufacturing 
ecosystem rooted in open reference boards, and a culture in 
which the bill of materials (a list of all the materials that 
goes into making a particular device, something that a 
company like Apple keeps strictly closed) is shared. This 
open culture of production has enabled local chip 
manufacturers such as Allwinner and Rockchip to compete 
with renowned international corporations like Intel. At the 
crux of this manufacturing process is their speed to market, 
driven by what Larry Ma describes as “hunger.” In the 
shanzhai ecosystem, ideation, prototyping and design 
happen alongside the manufacturing process. Products are 
designed in relation to the demands of a fast changing 
market. Rather than spending months or years deliberating 
over the next big hit, shanzhai builds on existing platforms 
and processes, iterating in small steps. In this way, shanzhai 
brings new products to the market with remarkable speed.  
In Shenzhen, cellphones can go from conceptual designs to 
production-ready in 29 days. Products are market-tested 
directly by throwing small batches of several thousand 
pieces of a given product into the market. If there is demand 
and they sell quickly, more will be produced. There is a 
commitment to never building from scratch (an approach 
that is shared by the open source community). Prototyping 
and consumer testing occur rapidly and alongside the 
manufacturing iteration process, rather than occurring 
beforehand (where it is commonly placed in Western-
centric design models).  
A particular social dynamic is crucial to this design in 
manufacturing process. Personal and business lives blend, 
and important decisions with regards to investment, release 
dates, and collaboration partners are often made over 
informal dinner meet-ups and weekend gatherings. These 
social connections are central to getting business done in 
Shenzhen, as we discuss in greater detail in the next section. 
Many of our interlocutors saw themselves as belonging to a 
grassroots community and maintained that it was the mutual 
support of Shenzhen’s open manufacturing culture that 
enabled their competitive advantage.  
MAKING IT IN SHENZHEN 
Shenzhen’s population comes from elsewhere. More than 
95% of the city’s population is migrants. Shenzhen’s 
technology sector grew from the intersection of two early 
flows. The first were technological entrepreneurs from 
Taiwan, involved in the early chip industry, who sought to 
take advantage of China’s economic opening and it’s initial 
experiments with SEZ’s. This stream of capital cross-fed 
into a giant internal movement throughout the Mainland, in 
which a vast ‘floating population’, freed from the controls 
of the command economy, poured into the coastal cities 
looking for work. This dynamic is still very much at work 
today. In the summer of 2014, Foxconn was reported to be 
recruiting 100 000 workers to build the iPhone 6.  
It is not only the promise of a better income, but the hopes 
for a different future that motivate hundreds of thousands of 
migrant workers every year to seek employment in 
Shenzhen, often far away from their home towns and 
families, sending back remittances.  Though, as is widely 
reported, there is an issue of sweatshop labor in Shenzhen, 
many of the people we met during our research promote 
Shenzhen as full of opportunities, a dream city, a place 
where “you can make it” in China today. Violet Su, for 
instance, worked her way up from a part-time job to 
personal assistant to Seeed Studio2’s CEO “Shenzhen is a 
good place to live,” she says. “If you go to another city, 
people treat you like outsiders. But here everyone belongs. 
It’s like as if everyone was born here. When I first came to 
Shenzhen I really liked one of the city’s slogan that 
decorated the bus: ‘When you come to Shenzhen, you are a 
local person.’”  
Many who enter the shanzhai ecosystem do not come from 
privileged socio-economic backgrounds. Take, for instance, 
Ye Wang (anonymized), the manager of a shanzhai tablet 
company. Wang is one of the few, who “made it.” His 
company has revenue of several million USD a year, 
shipping tablets to South America, Eastern Europe, Russia, 
and the United States. Wang originally came to Shenzhen at 
the urging of a relative who was working at the Chinese car 
manufacturer BYD (Build Your Dream) and who helped 
                                                           
2 Seeed Studio is a Chinese hardware facilitator that sells open 
hardware products and educational kits, and connects makers 
driven to move from prototyping into production with Shenzhen’s 
manufacturing ecosystem. www.seeedstudio.com 
 
Wang to get a corporate scholarship that funded his college 
education. After college, Wang entered what he calls “the 
shanzhai community.” He made a name for himself by 
leading a development team that produced one of the first 
copycat versions of the Apple iPad. The localized, slightly 
altered version of the tablet was introduced into the Chinese 
market before Apple had officially released the iPad in the 
United States. This did not go by unnoticed by bigger 
players in the shanzhai ecosystem. Wang explained how, 
once one has gained trust and made a name for themselves, 
it is easy to find partners who are willing to freely share 
resources: “Shenzhen is working just like this. You can 
understand it as crowdfunding. It works differently from 
crowdfunding via online social networking … you must be 
firmly settled in the industry, be recognized, have a good 
personality… Everybody in the industry chain gives you 
things for free, all the materials, and only when you have 
sold your product, you do the bills [and pay back].” 
Wang, here, describes an important funding mechanism that 
enables people who lack the financial resources to 
nevertheless receive support from within the larger 
shanzhai network. People become part of this social 
network by participating in both informal face-to-face 
gatherings (over dinner, lunch, at the manufacturing site) 
and networking via mobile social media platforms such as 
Wechat (www.wechat.cn). Much of the offline activity 
takes place over alcohol-infused meals, KTV bars and 
massage parlors, establishments that are frequented by a 
largely male clientele, (all of which speaks to a strong 
gender hierarchy that infuses shanzhai culture). People in 
shanzhai think of themselves as driven and hard working, 
committed to improving their standard of living and to 
make money. Many considered the level of entrepreneurial 
possibilities unique to Shenzhen: “there is no other place 
like this in China. Here you find a lot of opportunities, you 
can become yourself, you can realize your dream, you can 
make a story out of your life.”  
Shanzhai production is fast and nimble mostly due to this 
unique social fabric through which decisions about new 
products, design and pricing are made collaboratively. This 
process entails people to be “on 24/7.” Every personal 
interaction, no matter if offline or online, is also about 
furthering a collective goal: the expansion and spread of 
business opportunities, the discovery of niche markets and 
the distillation of new mechanisms that will generate 
additional sales. In this way shanzhai production culture is 
not dissimilar from Silicon Valley, with its male dominated 
management and entrepreneurial leadership, hard-driven 
work ethic and peer pressure, all of which forms a close-
knit community of informal socializing and information 
sharing [41].  
MAKERS IN SHENZHEN 
In the last few years, Shenzhen has begun to draw yet 
another wave of migrants – mobile elites such as tech 
entrepreneurs, hackers, makers, geeks and artists, who are 
drawn to the city’s abundance of materials and the 
production processes located here. For many of these 
newcomers the first stop in Shenzhen are the markets of 
Huaqiangbei (华强北), a 15-by-15-city block area, filled 
with large department store buildings. Each mall contains a 
labyrinth of stalls spread over several floors (see Figure 3). 
Malls specialize in everything from basic components such 
as LEDs, resistors, buttons, capacitors, wires, and boards to 
products such as laptops, phones, security cameras, etc. For 
makers, the markets provide immediate access to tools, 
components and expertise. Ian Lesnet from Dangerous 
Prototypes, a company that sells open hardware kits, 
describes the lure of Huaqiangbei and Shenzhen as a whole: 
“The wonderful thing about Shenzhen is that we have both 
horizontal and vertical integration. In Huaqiangbei, you can 
buy components. Go a little bit further out, people sell 
circuit boards. A little bit further out, there are people who 
manufacture things and attach components to circuit boards. 
So you can actually have something built. And a little 
further out there are people who make product cases. A 
little further out you have garages with large-format printers 
who make labels for your products and a little further out 
they recycle it back down again. So you can build 
something, design it entirely, have it manufactured, sell it, 
and then break it down its components and recycle it back 
into the center of the markets. You have all the skills and all 
the people who can do that and they are all here in one 
place. And that’s what’s really enticing about Shenzhen.”  
“Living in Shenzhen is like living in a city-size techshop,” 
echoes Zach Smith, one of the co-founders of the 3D printer 
Makerbot. Smith first came to Shenzhen when Makerbot 
started to collaborate with a local manufacturing business. 
Since then he has spent many years working and living in 
the city and has learnt to adapt to what he calls Shenzhen’s 
“native design language.” “If you come to Shenzhen, you 
are going to take your American design language and you 
Figure 3. Huaqiangbei markets (upper left to bottom right): 
USB sticks shaped as plastic figurines, stacks of wires, 
assortment of magnets, department store building view from 
the top. 
 
are going to have to translate it,” Smith explains. “If you 
are out here you can start to learn that local design 
language, and start using it in your own designs… It helps 
you make designs that are easier to manufacture, because 
you are not substituting a bunch of stuff… People out here 
can build their designs in this native way. As you go and 
meet with manufacturers you understand their design 
process, how they want to build things, or what they are 
capable of building. This changes the way you want to do 
your design, because as a designer, if you are a good 
designer, you are going to try and adapt to the techniques 
instead of making the techniques adapt to you.” 
What Smith describes here was something many of the 
makers we interviewed experienced; transforming their 
designs through interactions with factories, engineering 
processes, machines and materials. Manufacturers and 
makers work together to prototype, test materials and 
functionality, continuously altering everything from the 
shapes of product casings to PCB design (Printed Circuit 
Board). Together, they iterate and shape the design of the 
final product through a process that typically spans several 
months of frequent often-weekly meetings. Take, for 
instance, maker entrepreneur Amanda Williams, one of the 
few women active in the scene. She has been working 
closely with several different manufacturing units in 
Shenzhen during the process of designing an interactive 
lamp. Williams reflects on these collaborations as follows:  
“sometimes you find out from a factory that this won't work 
or that won't work, or you can't use this size because you 
need a certain amount of wall thickness or this material's 
gonna break… working with the factories, we understand 
how to modify our design, in order to make it better for 
mass manufacturing.” 
Makers working in Shenzhen are brought closer to the 
tactility that lies at the heart of hardware design. In molding 
their visions whilst enmeshed – rather than removed from – 
the context of manufacturing, their designs become tuned to 
the materiality of the hardware, modulating their visions 
through bodily reactions to the size of a button or the feel of 
a knob, as Ian Lesnet elaborates: “When you design 
electronics, it's not just an engineering problem. It's a 
design process. Being able to just walk into Huaqiangbei, 
touch buttons, push them, be like, ‘Oh, this one is weak. 
This one is strong.’ Choosing things. Holding things. Get 
this amount of knowledge that you don't get sitting at a 
computer sitting somewhere else in the world” (see Figure 
4). Many agreed that this tacit and embedded learning had 
become central to their design process and was something 
they learned only after they had arrived in Shenzhen. “In 
school, they don't teach you DFM, design for 
manufacturing, at all,” says Antonio Belmontes from Helios 
Bikes, “the factory helps us bring our ideas down to design 
for manufacturing. They also help you save money. 
Especially when you approach them during the design 
process.” 
What draws tech entrepreneurs, makers and designers to 
Shenzhen is that phases of ideation, design, market testing, 
and industrial production evolve together in an iterative 
process (as opposed to design practices in which ideation 
and prototyping are thought of as phases that proceed and 
then guide processes of execution). What emerges is a 
tactile and deeply embodied design practice that requires 
close connections with both materials and the local skillsets 
that many describe as a highly professionalized form of 
making in action. John Seely Brown, former director of 
Xerox Park, during a visit to Shenzhen, reflected upon this 
process by speaking of tacit versus explicit knowledge. 
“What you are really doing,” he said speaking of hardware 
production in Shenzhen, “is modulating a conversation 
between your tools and the materials your are working on 
for some end result. And you are overseeing that dance in 
its own right.”  
SEEED STUDIO & THE 2014 SHENZHEN MAKER FAIRE 
Much of what we see with regards to maker 
entrepreneurialism in Shenzhen today goes back to the early 
efforts of Seeed Studio, a Chinese hardware facilitator that 
connects Shenzhen’s world of manufacturing with the 
global maker scene. Seeed Studio was founded in 2008 by 
the then 26-year old Eric Pan（潘浩）and grew quickly 
from a two-people start-up into a successful business that 
now has more than 10 Million USD annual revenue and 
over 200 employees. Seeed Studio sells hardware kits, 
microcontroller platforms, and custom-made printed circuit 
boards to makers. It also provides highly personalized 
services. One of Seeed Studio’s core businesses is to enable 
maker start-ups to move from an idea to mass production by 
identifying what Eric Pan calls “pain points”—moments of 
transition, where a company lacks the knowledge of how to 
scale up. Seeed Studio products have gained reputation 
worldwide. They are offered for purchase online, on maker-
specific platforms, and in mainstream retailers in the US. 
When HAXLR8R opened its doors as one of the first 
hardware incubator programs in Shenzhen in 2012 it was 
with the help and in the offices of Seeed Studio.  
Figure 4. in Huaqiangbei: makers getting a "feel" for 
different components. Photos by first author, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 5. "Innovate with China," product label by Seeed 
Studio. 
Eric Pan has become an influential voice of China’s maker 
scene eager to demonstrate that “made in China” can mean 
something more than just copycats and cheap labor. The 
first thing one reads, when entering the offices of Seeed 
Studio, is the tagline “innovate with China,” painted on a 
large mural wall. A pun on the “made in China” brand, it is 
also the label that adorns Seeed Studio products (see Figure 
5). “When I came to the US in 2010, people there knew us 
and liked our products, but nobody wanted to believe that 
we are a Chinese company,” Pan recalls, “nobody had 
thought that cool and innovative products could come of 
China. That’s why, ever since, we have been using 
‘innovate with China’ on our product labels to demonstrate 
that manufacturing in China can mean ‘partnership’ and 
innovation instead of cheap labor and low quality.” 
“Innovate with China” was also the slogan of China’s first 
featured Maker Faire that took place in April 2014, 
organized and hosted by Seeed Studio. The Maker Faire 
constituted an opportune moment for Seeed Studio to 
demonstrate its vision of China’s creative role in the world 
of making and manufacturing. People who attended the 
Maker Faire were well-known figures in the maker 
community, and included amongst others Dale Dougherty, 
founder of MAKE magazine, Chris Anderson, who 
authored the book Makers, Tom Igoe who co-founded 
Arduino, Jay Melican who carries the informal title “Intel’s 
Maker Czar,” Eri Gentry from BioCurious, Vincent Tong 
and Jack Lin from Foxconn. 
The talks and presentations at the Shenzhen Maker Faire 
were wrapped between two keynote speeches: Dale 
Dougherty, considered by many to be the founding father of 
the US maker movement, gave the opening speech, while 
Vincent Tong and Jack Lin (林志聪)  from Foxconn, gave 
the closing plenary. Dougherty, in his talk, focused on the 
creativity that lies in making one thing. He emphasized the 
culture of hobbyist creation and tinkering that went into the 
early stages of development of the first Apple computer, 
and described making as an adventure where the outcomes 
are uncertain. Tong and Lin, on the other hand, talked about 
the opportunities and challenges that lie in scaling up, 
moving from making one thing to making hundreds of 
thousands or millions of things. While Dougherty 
emphasized processes of tinkering and play, Tong and Lin 
focused on the role of design in the professionalized 
manufacturing process, or as Lin put it: “the process of 
making just one thing is very different from continuous 
production. It requires cross-disciplinary work. Hardware 
is different from the Internet. You need to think about 
design from the beginning. Design is central to all steps of 
the process of manufacturing including differentiation, 
customization, standardization… You also need to design 
for future manufacturing, for the next assembly you need to 
think about this from the beginning of the design process.” 
The Shenzhen Maker Faire was Dougherty’s first visit to 
China. When we interviewed Dougherty during his visit, he 
reflected on the differences of making in the US and in 
China. “It’s an indeterminate problem of ‘how do I get this 
made?” he said speaking of the difficulties many hobbyist 
and professional makers face in the US, “where should I go 
to find the parts?” Makerspaces address part of the issue, 
he further elaborated, but scaling up was almost impossible: 
“They don't necessarily have the context, skill sets or 
knowledge to make. Even, "What are the right things to 
make or not make at all?" Part of it is that American 
manufacturing is geared to large companies, and so those 
interfaces aren't there for a small company.” Dougherty, 
here, counters the overly euphoric narratives that view 
making as enabling an easy return to the “made in 
America” brand. “I see this as an information problem,” he 
says “you might find out while being here that if you 
manufacture it this way, you should have designed it 
differently.’” 
In Shenzhen, design on the factory floor is not unique to 
shanzhai, as those involved in the process know well. For 
instance, what transpired from a couple of visits to a big 
contract manufacturer (anonymized), even companies like 
Apple have their designers and engineers (just like maker 
entrepreneurs) work side by side with the designers and 
engineers at the factory, iterating together until the very last 
minute, when the product is frozen for release. This is in 
contrast to a common perception of Apple as the creator 
who outsources to the cheap labor provided by the 
manufacturer. 
DISCUSSION 
“Apple computers are this really big example. Designed in 
California, made in Shenzhen. We pride ourselves on 
design and we don't have to do that other work. Remember 
the paperless office. Things would just be designed on 
computers and then made. It was almost like we didn't need 
that dirty world near us. It could be in China… But physical 
things have properties that speak to us intuitively that we 
cannot just analyze on a computer screen, no matter how 
much resolution we have. That's calling into question that 
split between designed here and made there. “  
 
(Dale Dougherty, Interview with the  
authors, April 2014) 
This paper sets out to question a prevailing myth of 
technological production in which design is separated from 
what Dougherty, here, calls the “dirty world” of 
manufacturing.  It does so by focusing on the culture of  
open production and design that has developed in Shenzhen 
over the last 30 years. More specifically, our research has 
concentrated on how the ecosystem of shanzhai emerged 
alongside the more-well known processes of outsourcing 
and governmental policy that opened up the region to 
foreign investment. 
In doing so, our work challenges some of the prevalent 
discourses and practice around making and its engagement, 
however implicit, with participatory design. Central to the 
early efforts of participatory design, and critical scholarship 
of computing more broadly, has been an emphasis on the 
user and a desire to empower those who might have less say 
in technological production. Prominent figures of the maker 
movement have turned this call for individual 
empowerment into a powerful business strategy, e.g. [1]. 
Many maker kits and smart devices are marketed as 
educational in that they train their consumers to become 
producers themselves. Today, many users of digital 
fabrication tools and open hardware platforms are indeed 
producing a wide and rich variety of software code, 
electronic schematics, 3D designs, and so on. Committed to 
the culture and spirit of open source, many of these users 
also freely share their design contributions. Maker products, 
in this sense, function much like social media apps such as 
Facebook or virtual worlds like Second Life, in which the 
value of the product is significantly shaped by what people 
“make” with it [8]. While this certainly broadens the range 
and number of “participants” in the design of technology it 
is also subject to a growing critique of the “sharing 
economy,” in which, “the labor of users, fans, and 
audiences is being put to work by firms” [45]. 
Moreover, digital fabrication tools such as the 3D printer or 
the CNC milling machine, which are envisioned to enable a 
broader audience to engage with processes of making, often 
keep the designer at arm’s length from the kind of tacit 
knowledge necessarily involved in the manufacturing-
centered design process we have described in this paper. 
While digital fabrication tools provide techniques for rapid 
prototyping in a design studio, they do not engage one with 
the situated and embodied processes of manufacturing on a 
large scale. What becomes increasingly clear from our 
engagement with Shenzhen is that, to repeat Dougherty’s 
point stated above, “physical things have properties that 
speak to us intuitively that we cannot just analyze on a 
computer screen, no matter how much resolution we have.” 
Thus, whilst the promotion of a return to hands-on making 
is pervasive (“everyone is a maker”), many of the software 
applications aimed at bringing designers into the production 
of hardware have been oriented around creating an abstract 
representation of production [17]. This separates the 
designer and maker from the embedded and embodied 
practice of production and the tacit knowledge that is 
essential to cultures of production documented here. Our 
aim is to challenge a mythic structure of technology 
innovation in which the “creative” work of design is 
highlighted, while the work of manufacturing remains at 
arms length. In short, we follow Bannon and Ehn in 
arguing, alongside the tradition of design anthropology, that 
the insights “from an understanding of material culture” be 
“more directly fed on to the practices of participatory 
design” [3]. A rigorous participatory design practice not 
only includes a deep engagement with the social context of 
users, but also with the material and social conditions of 
contemporary production.  
Maker entrepreneurs who come to Shenzhen to turn visions 
of smart and networked devices into products are 
intersecting with these embedded and tactile processes of 
production. Indeed, it is the close proximity to the processes 
and materials of production that makes the city so enticing 
to makers. As we have shown in this paper, it is not just 
access to tools and machines, but a particular process of 
design that draws makers into Shenzhen; prototyping is part 
and parcel of fabrication, rather than preceding it; and 
testing and designing evolves through daily interactions 
with the workings of machines, materials, components, and 
tools. From the electronic markets and craftsman 
workshops to assembly lines and design solution houses, 
Shenzhen immerses technology designers in a mode of 
prototyping that is tied to the feel and touch of materials as 
well as the concrete processes of manufacturing. Many of 
the people we interviewed agreed that “being in it” was 
crucial to learning, understanding, and working with what 
they considered to be an open, informal and highly 
professionalized design practice.  
The goal of this paper has been to critically unpack 
contemporary maker discourse by examining the remake of 
Shenzhen. In so doing, we question the imaginary of 
Shenzhen as the “Silicon Valley for Hardware,” that has 
been fueled by promotional campaigns of hardware 
incubators and corporate investment in the region. These 
often linear stories of progress, which assume that 
Shenzhen is “catching up” with innovation centers like 
Silicon Valley, tend to be void of the intricacies of the 
region’s production processes described in this paper; from 
its history of outsourcing and piracy to the global scale of 
contemporary shanzhai production. We have shown that 
innovation, design and production are necessarily situated, 
evolving in close relation to particular histories of 
technological, economic and social development. In this, 
the paper follows the call to locate design [9, 23, 25, 46] so 
as to include the site of industrial production itself. Efforts 
in critical computing have long called upon researchers and 
designers to reflect upon “the values, attitudes, and ways of 
looking at the world that we are unconsciously building into 
our technologies” as well as the “values, practices and 
 
experiences that are unconsciously, but systematically left 
out” [42].  
Clearly this extends well beyond the common user-designer 
relationship. What values, norms and attitudes towards 
manufacturing and production do we consciously or 
unconsciously build not just into our designs, but also into 
our critical theories and practices? What new possibilities 
are opened up if we take seriously diverse and distributed 
cultures of production? Who is considered a legitimate 
participant in the “maker” revamp of industrial production? 
What expertise and work is rendered invisible as makers 
turn visions of networked objects into mass-produced 
artifacts? These questions recall the central concerns of 
early theorists of participatory design: a deep engagement 
with sites of production, labor, and manufacturing.  
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